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PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
All applicable statutes and regulations are contained in the Appellants’ Brief.
 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici groups are public-interest law firms and public policy research 
foundations dedicated to advancing individual liberty.  By publishing reports, 
books, and articles, as well as through litigation, they have established themselves 
at the forefront of the movement for limited government and free markets.  
 Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at 
the Georgetown University Law Center.  Barnett has taught constitutional law, 
contracts, and criminal law, among other subjects, and has published more than 
100 articles and reviews, plus nine books.  He argued Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1 (2005), before the Supreme Court and in 2008 was awarded a Guggenheim 
Fellowship in Constitutional Studies. 
   This case concerns amici because it represents the federal government’s 
most egregious attempt to exceed its constitutional powers. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce under existing doctrine.  The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects” doctrine—stop 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, both parties, through their respective counsel, 
consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel for any party authored this brief in 
whole or in part and no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution to 
fund its preparation or submission. 
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 Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of its 
consequences for the economy.  Nor can Congress conscript an inactive person 
into commerce even if it purports to do so pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme. 
The Constitution does not permit Congress to compel citizens into economic 
transactions to remedy the admitted shortcomings of a sloppily written law. 
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to adopt reasonable 
means to regulate interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting Congress 
to ignore constitutional limits by manufacturing necessities.  Indeed, any law—
“necessary” or otherwise—that would transform Congress’s authority into a 
generalized police power is unconstitutional.   
While the government emphasizes the “uniqueness” of the health care 
market and the wisdom of the legislation at issue, “this case is not about whether 
the Act is wise or unwise . . . in fact, it is not really about our health care system at 
all.  It is principally about our federalist system, and . . . the Constitutional role of 
the federal government.”  Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *6 (N.D. Fla. 
Jan. 31, 2011).   
What Congress has attempted here is literally unprecedented.  As one district 
court ruling for the government recognized, “in every Commerce Clause case 
presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity.  In this regard, the Health 
 2
 Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.”  Thomas More 
Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).   Or, as the 
lower court conceded: “previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved 
physical activity, as opposed to mental activity, i.e. decision-making, [so] there is 
little judicial guidance on whether the latter falls within Congress’s power.”  Mead 
v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55 (D.D.C. Feb. 
22, 2011). 
The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never 
required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the 
United States.”  Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual 
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).  Nor has Congress ever before 
imposed on every person a civil penalty for declining to buy a product.  Even in 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” 
the power to regulate what farmers grew, not to force mandate that people become 
farmers or buy farm products.2  Even if not buying health insurance is an 
“economic activity”—which of course would mean that every aspect of human life 
is economic activity—there is no constitutional warrant for Congress to force 
Americans to buy a particular good or service. 
                                                 
2 So, too, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the federal government 
successfully defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by 
emphasizing that it did not compel economic activity.  See id. at 621 (argument of 
Mr. Jackson) (“No compliance with any scheme of federal regulation is involved.”) 
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 Although the substantial effects test is often conceived as a Commerce 
Clause doctrine, it actually interprets the Necessary and Proper Clause in the 
context of the power to regulate commerce.  Consequently, the limitations of this 
doctrine mark the boundaries of necessity and propriety.  Because economic 
mandates do not fall within this doctrine, it is unconstitutional to impose economic 
mandates on the people under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.   
Even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” however, they are not 
“proper” because they unconstitutionally “commandeer” individuals.  Economic 
mandates alter the constitutional structure in an unprecedented way and thus do not 
“consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Explicit Purpose of Article I is to Limit Congress’s Powers 
 
That Congress is limited to its enumerated powers has been universally 
accepted throughout American history.  This sentiment was initially expressed in 
the Declaration of Independence, which explains that governments do not grant 
people rights, but, instead, are “instituted” to secure pre-existing rights.  The 
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  Later, the Constitution’s framers 
chose to grant Congress only “special and enumerated powers, and not . . . general 
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 and unlimited powers.”  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States 2 § 906 (1833).  Indeed, the text of the Constitution clearly creates a 
limited federal government of enumerated powers.  Unlike Article II, which 
begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President,” or Article III, which 
begins, “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court,” Article I begins, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).  This language expressly denies Congress any 
generalized power, but authorizes only those powers that are “herein granted.”  See 
United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (“This clause necessarily 
implies that some legislative powers are not ‘herein granted,’ foremost among 
them ‘the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government.’” 
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)).  Even the 
Commerce Clause was primarily meant to stop state regulatory abuse.  West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (“The ‘negative’ aspect of 
the Commerce Clause was considered the more important by the ‘father of the 
Constitution,’ James Madison.”).   
During the ratification debates, Federalists emphasized that their opponents 
needed not fear the new government because it would enjoy only limited powers.   
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed., 
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 1961) (“State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which  
. . . were not, by [the Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United States.”); id. 
No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (“the proposed government[’s] . . . jurisdiction 
extends to certain enumerated objects only.”); id. No. 45, at 328 (James Madison) 
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite.”); Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying 
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates In The Several State 
Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution 196 (1859) (“The 
Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government.”); 
Archibald Maclaine, Remarks Before the Convention of the State of North 
Carolina (July 28, 1788), in 4 id. at 140 (“The powers of Congress are limited and 
enumerated.  We . . . have given them those powers, but we do not say we have 
given them more.”). 
So critical was the principle of enumerated powers that many Founders 
believed it rendered a Bill of Rights superfluous—and even dangerous—because it 
might imply that the federal government’s authority was not limited to those 
powers.  See Federalist No. 84, supra, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Why 
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?”).  To 
explicitly refute this implication, and clarify that the federal government enjoys 
 6
 only limited, enumerated powers, the Framers added the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-92 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring).   
Given the Framers’ clear intent to create a limited federal government of 
enumerated powers, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has consistently 
reaffirmed that the federal government does not enjoy a general police power.  See, 
e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 187 (1824); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 (1907); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
 
II. The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce 
Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine 
 
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to the Commerce Power and Allows Congress to 
Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority 
 
  Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular 
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering 
whether Congress can regulate it.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).  The 
New Deal cases which first developed the “substantial effects” doctrine, however, 
found the authority for that doctrine not in the Commerce Clause itself but in its 
execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Although often described as 
expanding the definition of the word “commerce,” the cases show that the New 
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 Deal Court actually asked whether federal regulation of the activity in question 
was a necessary and proper means of exercising the regulatory power, because the 
activity substantially affects that commerce.  “Congress’s regulatory authority over 
intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.”  Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United 
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78 (1838); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 
301-02 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C. 
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  Congress has never 
been allowed to go further. 
  In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court 
considered Congress’s power to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the 
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and 
hours.”  Id. at 105.  Instead of stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court 
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which 
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate.”  Id.  The authority cited for this proposition 
did not come from Gibbons—the Commerce Clause case cited throughout 
Darby—but from McCulloch, the seminal Necessary and Proper Clause case. 
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   A year later, in Wickard, the Court used the same reasoning: not redefining 
“commerce,” but ruling that the challenged measures were a necessary and proper 
means for regulating commerce.  Like Darby, Wickard explicitly relied on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch.  See 317 U.S. at 130, n.29.  
Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause, standing alone, to include the 
power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a Commerce Clause 
and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial effects doctrine 
reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011).  Thus the 
aggregation principle can only apply to economic activities the regulation of which 
is necessary and proper to effectuating Congress’s legitimate regulatory power. 
Accordingly, the Court in Lopez found that aggregation could apply only to 
economic activity: “Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most-far-reaching 
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic 
activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”  514 U.S. at 
560.  And in Morrison, the Court held that gender-motivated violence is not 
economic activity and thus fell outside Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  529 U.S. at 613.  In these and other decisions, the Court clarified the 
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 substantial effects doctrine by setting the regulation of intrastate economic activity 
(in certain contexts) as the absolute limit of federal power under the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  “Where economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added). 
  Conversely, non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it 
affects interstate commerce through a “but-for causal chain,” or has, in the 
aggregate, “substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or 
consumption.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.  The object of regulation must have a 
“close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), and that relationship must be qualitative, not 
just quantitative.  Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843 
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Morrison, supra; accord, United States v. 
Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677, n. 11 (5th Cir. 1997). 
  Adopting the distinction between economic and non-economic activity 
allowed the Court to determine whether legislation is “necessary” under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause without involving it in complex, potentially insoluble 
evaluations of the “more or less of necessity or utility” of the law.  Alexander 
Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23, 
1791), in Hamilton: Writings 619 (J. Freeman, ed., 2001).  This distinction limits 
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 congressional power when regulating intrastate economic activity to activities 
closely connected to interstate commerce, thus withholding from Congress any 
unconstitutional police powers, see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, preserving the 
role of states in the federalist system, and minimizing the degree of judicial 
involvement in utilitarian considerations that are outside the courts’ expertise.  
  In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which 
Congress cannot go when choosing “necessary” means to execute its powers.  The 
substantial effects doctrine, limited by Lopez and Morrison to economic activities, 
marks the outmost bounds of “necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
  But if regulating intrastate economic activity can be a “necessary” means of 
regulating interstate commerce as that term is understood under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the obvious corollary is that regulating non-economic activity 
cannot be “necessary,” regardless of its effect on interstate commerce.  And a 
power to regulate inactivity is even more remote from Congress’s power over 
interstate commerce. 
Most recently, in Raich, the Court found the cultivation of marijuana to be 
an economic activity—indeed, a type of “manufacture,” 545 U.S. at 22—that 
Congress could prohibit as a necessary and proper means of exercising of its 
commerce power.  Raich explicitly adhered to the economic/non-economic 
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 distinction set out in Lopez and Morrison.  “Our case law firmly establishes 
Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 17 
(emphasis added).   
Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or 
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of an interstate-traded commodity that subjected 
them to federal law.  See Barnett, supra, at 602-03.  Instead, the Court invoked the 
Webster’s Dictionary definition of “economics”—“the production, distribution, 
and consumption of commodities,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and refused to adopt 
the sweeping theory the government advances here, that non-participation in the 
marketplace is itself economic activity.  This Court soon thereafter reaffirmed that 
definition of “economic” when it held in United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 
891 (D.C. Cir 2006), that child pornography is “quintessentially economic” 
activity, “involv[ing] the manufacture and distribution of a commodity subject to 
the forces of supply and demand,” and therefore properly subject to federal law. 
B.  Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper 
Clause’s Limits to the Commerce Clause 
 
No precedent allows Congress to compel activity in the guise of regulating 
commerce.  Roscoe Filburn was actively growing wheat.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 
114-15.  The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was voluntarily engaged in the 
economic activity of steelmaking.  NLRB., 301 U.S. at 26.  The Civil Rights Era 
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 cases concerned parties that chose to engage in the economic activity of operating 
a restaurant, Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296, or a hotel, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).  The Raich plaintiffs grew, processed, 
and consumed medicinal marijuana—all voluntary activities the Court 
characterized as “manufactur[ing].”  545 U.S. at 22. 
These cases fall into two general categories.  Id. at 35-38 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation 
of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of 
interstate commerce”).  First, if persons voluntarily engage in economic activity, 
for example by undertaking a commercial endeavor, Congress can regulate the 
manner by which their activities are conducted.  Such regulation of voluntary 
economic activity may include conditional mandates such as recordkeeping 
requirements.  The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s 
power to prohibit a type of commerce altogether—a power the Court has 
recognized at least since Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).  In Sullivan, 
therefore, this Court held that prohibiting intrastate possession of child 
pornography is within Congress’s powers because there would otherwise be “a 
significant gap in Congress’ comprehensive efforts to eliminate the market for 
sexually exploitative uses of children.”  451 F.3d at 891. 
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 Under either theory, however, Congress can regulate or prohibit voluntary 
economic actions, but cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if those 
actions would have economic consequences.  The distinguishing characteristic 
between a legitimate regulation within the constitutional scheme of enumerated 
powers, and a limitless federal police power capable of compelling whatever 
behavior Congress sees fit, is whether a person can, in principle, avoid federal 
regulations by choosing not to engage in the regulated activity—i.e., not engaging 
in an economic endeavor or obtaining contraband.  No such option exists with 
regard to the individual mandate; it cannot be avoided in principle.  It is not, 
therefore, a regulation of commercial activity, but an unprecedented command that 
individuals engage in commerce. 
C. The Comstock Factors That Are the Most Recent Articulation of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause’s Limits Weigh Against the 
Individual Mandate 
 
 In United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Supreme Court 
reiterated the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause, noting that a law which 
“confers on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States’” would not be necessary and 
proper.  Id. at 1964 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).  The Comstock Court 
upheld the federal civil commitment law at issue after weighing five factors: (1) 
the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal 
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 involvement in criminal prosecution, (3) the “sound reasons” for the statute given 
the government’s public safety goal, (4) “the statute’s accommodation of state 
interests” and (5) its narrow scope.  Id. at 1965. 
The Court avoided referring to these factors as a “test”; nor did it explain 
how they inter-relate, which weigh most heavily, or what to do when different 
factors point in different directions.  See Ilya Shapiro and Trevor Burrus, Not 
Necessarily Proper: Comstock’s Errors and Limitations, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 413, 
415 (2011).  Nevertheless, most of these factors—the lack of a deep history of 
federal involvement, PPACA’s failure to accommodate state interests, and its 
extraordinarily broad scope—weigh against the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate.  See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009-10 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 239, 260-67 
(2010) (assessing Comstock’s implications on PPACA litigation). 
First, although the Necessary and Proper Clause is “broad” in that it gives 
Congress leeway to choose the means for executing legitimate ends, it is not a 
grant of potentially endless power.  Recall from McCulloch that only those means 
which are “within the scope of the constitution . . . which are not prohibited, [and 
which] consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-23.  Cf. Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of The 
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 Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (“executory laws must be 
consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and 
individual rights.”).  The breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause thus does not 
warrant extending federal reach in a manner that contradicts fundamental 
constitutional principles like federalism and enumerated powers.  Nor does the 
“breadth of the Clause” factor vary from case to case; it is a constant. 
Second, there is no “long history” of federal involvement here, unlike in 
Comstock.  Not only is the individual mandate without parallel in constitutional 
history, but federal involvement in private health insurance is an entirely modern 
phenomenon.  See, e.g., Jeannie Jacobs Kronenfeld, The Changing Federal Role in 
U.S. Health Care Policy 67 (1997) (“[T]he bulk of the federal health legislation 
that has health impact . . . has actually been passed in the past 50 or so years.”).  
Third, the individual mandate does not accommodate state interests.  The 
civil commitment provision challenged in Comstock allowed states to assert 
authority over any individual committed under it, and indeed to prevent federal 
detention at the outset.  130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.  The individual mandate, by 
contrast, does not allow states to assert authority or prevent the compulsory 
purchase of health insurance.  Instead, it ejects states from their role as the primary 
authority for regulating citizens’ health insurance purchases.  And with over half 
the states suing to have PPACA declared unconstitutional, and many enacting 
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 legislation to protect citizens from the individual mandate, it is clear that the states 
do not believe their interests are being accommodated.   
Finally, the individual mandate is not narrow in scope.  It unavoidably 
applies to every resident American, excepting only the impoverished, and 
prescribes a blanket rule: buy insurance or pay a fine.  It asserts federal authority 
over not engaging in any activity that has ultimate economic consequences—
hardly a “narrow” proposition.   
The individual mandate fails the Comstock factors and therefore cannot pass 
muster under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  It conflicts with fundamental 
principles of limited federal power, intrudes on traditional state autonomy, and 
essentially converts Congress’ power to regulate commerce into a generalized 
police power with no principled limit.  The Constitution does not authorize such 
power either directly or by implication. 
 
III. The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of a 
Broader Regulatory Scheme” Because Congress Cannot Regulate 
Inactivity 
 
Unable to justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce Clause or 
Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing power theories 
not addressed here), the government has resorted to a new theory: that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate economic activity 
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 when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme.  In other words, 
while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, or a regulation of intrastate 
economic activity, or even a regulation of intrastate non-economic activity, the 
individual mandate is a necessary and proper means of exercising the lawful ends 
of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.   
The government’s argument rests on a sentence from Lopez and a concurring 
opinion by Justice Scalia in Raich that actually only identified circumstances in 
which Congress may reach wholly intrastate non-economic activity.  See Raich, 
545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of 
intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate 
commerce in two general circumstances.” (emphasis added)).  The first of these 
circumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which is limited to 
reaching intrastate economic activity.  The second is the proposition that 
“Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 37 
(emphasis added).  These precedents do not justify expanding Congress’s 
regulatory authority to allow it to compel economic activity. 
A. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity 
The government and the lower courts ruling in its favor have implicitly 
acknowledged that Congress can regulate only “activity” by redefining that word 
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 to include the making of an “economic decision,” or a decision not to act or to 
remain uninsured, or numerous other “active” articulations of the status of not 
owning health insurance.  For example, the decision below described the difference 
between activity and inactivity as “pure semantics,” and held that Congress can 
regulate any “mental activity, i.e., decision-making,” which has an ultimate 
economic effect.  Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *60.  If a “decision” not 
to act is a federally regulable action, however, then inactivity is transformed into 
activity by a linguistic alchemy that has at least three weaknesses.   
First, the difference between activity and inactivity—or acts and 
omissions—is a genuine and long-respected one.  See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984) (“there runs through much of the law a 
distinction between action and inaction.”).  It is a basic principle of tort law, for 
example, that one has no duty to act, and cannot generally be punished for 
nonfeasance, but has only a duty to act reasonably, and not commit misfeasance.  
See, e.g., McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, 91 F.3d 1501, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  So too in criminal law one cannot generally be convicted without engaging 
in some activity.  See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (the law 
“does not punish mere thought”); United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832, 835 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989).  The activity/inactivity distinction is intuitively obvious and understood 
by the ordinary person.  It is also the foundation of moral philosophy relevant to 
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 debates over health care law and policy.  See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Killing and 
Letting Die, in Moral Dilemmas 78-87 (2002) (distinguishing between prohibited 
killing and allowable withholding of care).  Contrary to the district court’s holding, 
it is the redefinition of inactivity as a type of activity that is a semantic trick.   
Second, while activity means engaging in a particular, definite act, inactivity 
means not engaging in a literally infinite set of acts.  At any instant, there are 
innumerable economic transactions in which one is not entering.  To allow 
Congress discretionary power to impose compulsory economic mandates within 
this infinite set of inactions—without constitutional constraint—would amount to 
granting the federal government a plenary and unlimited police power of the sort 
the Constitution specifically withholds.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (“The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary 
police power”); and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal 
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.”).  
Finally, if inaction is deemed “economic” because of its economic effects, 
then the distinction between economic and non-economic activity established in 
Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would collapse.  Indeed, Lopez and 
Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress may not regulate intrastate non-
economic activities even if, in the aggregate, they have substantial effects on 
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 interstate commerce.  But any class of activity or inactivity, in the aggregate, can 
be said to have some economic consequences.  To define inactivity as an economic 
activity would destroy the line the Supreme Court has time and again drawn 
between the intrastate economic activity that Congress may reach and the intrastate 
non-economic activity it may not.  This Court should not so disregard the 
overwhelming precedent governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses. 
B. The Activity/Inactivity Distinction Provides Judicially 
Manageable Standards with a Minimum of Judicial Policymaking 
 
There must be some principled limit to Congress’s regulatory authority to 
prevent it from laying claim to a general police power.  The most obvious line to 
draw is one between regulating activity—whether economic or non-economic—
and inactivity.  Such a distinction provides a judicially administrable limiting 
principle with a minimum of judicial intrusion into complicated political or 
economic analysis.  It is also consistent with existing precedent.  In Lopez, the 
Court observed that Congress can regulate intrastate non-economic activity when 
doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”  514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).  In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed 
that “Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37 
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 (emphasis added).  Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Justice Scalia used the word 
“activity” or “activities” 42 times.  See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You 
to Be Healthy?  N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39.  There is good reason to doubt 
that Justice Scalia—who has called the Necessary and Proper Clause “the last, best 
hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.)—would extend his proposed doctrine to reach 
inactivity.  See also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1983 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the 
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines 
would serve the same general purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction: 
ensuring that uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute the commerce 
power are truly incidental to that power and not remote, or mere “pretext[s]” for 
“the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government.”  McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.  However imperfect, some such line must be drawn to 
preserve Article I’s structure of enumerated and therefore limited powers. See 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although the resolution of 
specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution 
workable standards to assist in preserving separation of powers and checks and 
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 balances.”). Because accepting the government’s theory in this case would 
effectively demolish that structure, that theory is constitutionally unsatisfactory. 
  Instead of offering a limiting principle to its asserted power to compel 
activity as an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme, the government argues 
that the health insurance business is “unique” in various respects. See, e.g., Brief 
for Appellants at 7-11, Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011).  But examining the 
“uniqueness” of the regulated market and the problems Congress chose to 
ameliorate is precisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or less necessity” of a 
measure that the Supreme Court has always rejected as outside the judiciary’s 
proper sphere.  Courts must “identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to 
regulate more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and 
less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”  
Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
In the course of pointing to one particular “unique” aspect of health care, the 
government claims that the individual mandate is no different than requiring the 
advance purchase of health care.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 27, Florida v. 
HHS, supra.  Nearly everyone ultimately consumes health care—an economic 
act—so the federal government can direct that health care be (pre-)purchased now, 
by obtaining insurance, rather than later when the medical bill comes due.  Id.   
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 That argument does not provide a constitutional limit on Congress’s power.  
Virtually all forms of insurance represent timing decisions—paying up front for 
burial costs, loss of life, disability, supplemental income, credit default, business 
interruption, and more.  See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01 
(discussing cost-shifting and timing decisions in all insurance markets).  Only a 
federal government of unbounded powers could mandate that every American 
insure against such risks.  Id. at *102 (“There will be no stopping point if that 
should be deemed the equivalent of activity for Commerce Clause purposes.”).  
The government’s “unique market” argument thus provides no legal limit on 
federal authority, instead inviting standardless judicial examination of “how 
necessary” a congressional action is.  Courts should not be drawn into determining 
whether a particular market is “unique” or whether it “makes sense” to require that 
the product be paid for at one time or another. 
Enforcing the activity/inactivity distinction, by contrast, requires no such 
judicial policymaking and would affect no other existing law.  Congress could 
have reformed the health care system in many ways, for better or worse—including 
even a Medicare-for-Everyone “single payer” scheme—that would have been 
legally unassailable under existing Commerce Clause doctrine.  That it chose a 
scheme so flawed as to require otherwise unconstitutional patches to make it 
function does not make those “essential” provisions automatically constitutional. 
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 IV. The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause Because It Constitutes a “Commandeering of the People” 
 
The Supreme Court, in two cases presenting then-unprecedented assertions 
of power under the Commerce Clause, stated that Congress cannot use this power 
to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and executive officers.  Printz, 
supra; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  As the Court explained, 
doing so would be “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of 
dual sovereignty,” and therefore improper under our federalist system.  Printz, 521 
U.S. at 935.  The source of “residual state sovereignty” is the Tenth Amendment, 
which reiterates that the Constitution confers upon Congress “not all governmental 
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.”  Id. at 919.  The mandate at issue in 
Printz, even if necessary, thus could not be justified under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause:  “When a ‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce 
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth 
Amendment and other constitutional provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for 
carrying into execution the Commerce Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added). 
But the Tenth Amendment also recognizes that the people of the United 
States are sovereign: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United 
States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or 
to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added).  In this way, the text of 
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 the Tenth Amendment protects not just state sovereignty, but also popular 
sovereignty.  Just as mandating that states take action is improper commandeering, 
so too is mandating that individual citizens enter into transactions with private 
companies.  This amounts to what Prof. Barnett has called an improper 
“commandeering of the people.”  Supra at 621-34.   
As Chief Justice John Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 
471-72 (1793), the people are “truly the sovereigns of the country,” and elected 
officials merely their deputies, exercising delegated authority.  Fellow Founder 
James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the individual 
citizen:  “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an 
aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?”  Id. at 
456 (emphasis added).  Although the Eleventh Amendment reversed the outcome 
of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that Amendment as 
establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the priority of 
popular sovereignty.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n our 
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, 
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government 
exists and acts.”); accord Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“In our 
country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship 
to the people by taking away their citizenship.”). 
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 Thus, just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a 
means of regulating interstate commerce, it also bars a “commandeering of the 
people” for this purpose.  The very few mandates imposed on the people by the 
federal government either derive from other clauses of the Constitution—such as 
responding to censuses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, serving on juries, U.S. Const. 
amend. VI & VII, or paying income taxes, U.S. Const. amend. XVI—or rest on the 
fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that government.  See, e.g., 
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and 
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to 
reject a Thirteenth Amendment claim).  But citizens are not owned by the 
government and cannot be generally presumed to be subject to an indefinite federal 
command.  Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this anti-
commandeering principle.  For example, persons may not be mandated to quarter 
soldiers in their homes in time of peace, to testify against themselves, to labor for 
another, or to yield up other rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.  
U.S. Const. amends. III, V, IX, XIII.  In the United States there is not even a duty 
to vote.  There is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and noble duty” 
to engage in economic activity whenever doing so would be convenient to a 
congressional regulation of commerce.  To hold otherwise would be to deprive the 
people of the United States of the residual sovereignty recognized in the Tenth 
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 Amendment and to make them the servants, rather than the masters, of Congress.  
Cf. The Federalist No. 78 supra, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[to say] that the 
legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and 
that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon other departments” 
would “be to affirm that the deputy is greater than the principal; that the servant is 
above his master.”).  
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is 
not “proper.”  In New York, Justice O’Connor explained that mandates on states are 
improper because, “where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it 
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from 
the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  505 U.S. at 169.  That proposition 
applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: the individual mandate has 
allowed Congress and the president to escape political accountability for what 
amounts to a tax increase on persons making less than $250,000 per year by 
compelling them to make payments directly to private companies.  It is the evasion 
of political accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as a 
regulatory “requirement” enforced by a “penalty.”  
The individual mandate crosses the fundamental line between limited 
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the Congress’ 
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 political will—which is to say, not cabined at all.  Congress would then be the sole 
judge of the extent of its own authority—a proposition the Founders explicitly and 
repeatedly denied and which no federal court has ever endorsed.   
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 617-18 (1870), for example, 
the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Congress is the sole judge of what 
acts are necessary and proper to carrying out its enumerated powers.  To admit that 
Congress has such unreviewable discretion,  
and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in 
cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to [be 
“necessary and proper”], would completely change the nature of 
American government.  It would convert the government, which the 
people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a 
government of unlimited powers….  It would obliterate every 
criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief 
Justice [Marshall] in [McCulloch], established for the determination 
of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or 
unconstitutional.  
 
If the word “proper” is to be more than dead letter, it must at least mean that 
acts which destroy the very purpose of Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit 
the powers of Congress—are improper.  If the federal power to enact economic 
mandates were upheld here, Congress would be free to require anything of the 
citizenry so long as it was part of a national regulatory plan.  Unsupported by any 
fundamental, preexisting, or traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic 
mandates” on the people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of 
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 that word.  Allowing Congress to exercise such power would convert it from a 
government of delegated powers into one of general and unlimited authority. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted 
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate” not 
derived from pre-existing duties of citizenship.  Such economic mandates cannot 
be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines defining and limiting the powers 
of Congress.  Upholding the power to impose economic mandates “would 
fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the 
people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution 
limits federal power.”  Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well 
Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 
(June 2010). 
As one district court recognized, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause 
and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.”  Virginia 
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Only the Supreme Court is 
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power, so the district court 
here improperly interpreted the existing doctrinal limits in this area.  Accordingly, 
amici respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court. 
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